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John D. Blum* Balancing Regional Government
Health Mandates with Federal
Economic Imperatives:
Perspectives from Nova Scotia
and Illinois
This article focuses on current health policy changes in Canada and the United
States at the federal and regionallevels. The Canadian discussion centres on the
integrity of the Canada Health Act in the era of the Canada Health and Social
Transfer, and the strategies that provincial governments have pursued to cope
with persistent funding constraints. On the American side, the article examines
the role of private sector managed care plans in filling a health policy void
resulting from the demise of the Clinton Health Security Act. Two specific
regional government health reform initiatives in Nova Scotia and Illinois are
discussed as case studies of health care devolution on both sides of the border.
The article concludes with a comparative discussion of the two regional reform
programs and articulates lessons for health care policy in Canada and the United
States from the Nova Scotia and Illinois experiences.
Cet article examine les changements r6cents dans les principes gouvernant le
systeme de sante canadien etam6ricain, au niveau tantr6gionalque f6d6ral. Du
c6te canadien, la discussion porte sur I'int6grit6 de la Loi canadienne sur la
santd a la lumiere du Transfert canadien en matiere de sant6 et de programmes
sociaux, ainsi que de strat6gies adopt6es par les gouvernements provinciaux
pour survivre aux coupures budg6taires. Aux Etats-Unis, I'auteur etudie le r6le
du secteur priv dans le domaine de la sante qui tente de combler les besoins
causes par la disparition de la Loi sur I'assurance-sante du pr6sident Clinton.
Plus pr6cisement, Iarticle traite des r6formes entreprisesparles gouvernements
de la Nouvelle-Ecosse au Canada etde l'lllinois auxEtats-Unis, deux experiences
illustrant la delegation de pouvoirs dans le domaine de la sant6. Une 6tude
comparative de ces deux r6formes r6gionales est effectuee. Et, en terminant, les
auteurs formulent des solutions a apporter aux systemes de sante canadiens et
americains tir6es des exp6riences de la Nouvelle-Ecosse et de I'lllinois.
Introduction
At the twilight of the twentieth century governments world wide find it
increasingly difficult to fulfill the mandates of social service programs
that were crafted in more affluent times. More and more governments
find themselves in a precarious dance, in which they are forced to balance
* Associate Dean for Health Law Programs, Institute for Health Law, Loyola University,
Chicago, U.S.A.
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legal obligations and deficit politics. "Doing more with less" has become
a popular slogan in government circles, but while this.sentiment may be
presented with a positive spin, it is a hollow mantra barely disguising the
fact that publicly sponsored social programs must undergo drastic and
painful changes. Government sponsored health programs, in particular,
are under considerable strain as economic realities make it increasingly
difficult to meet public demands and to keep pace with science and
technology.
Governments in Europe and North America alike are looking for ways
to provide comprehensive medical coverage that are cost effective and,
at best, do not sacrifice public welfare.' In many instances governments
are frightened by the economic realities of health care and are seeking to
"get out from under" programmatic obligations with little consideration
about the impacts of change on health care access or quality. The search
for cost savings in health programs has resulted in the exploration of new
approaches to funding and managing publicly sponsored health systems,
driven almost exclusively by the need to confront the fiscal realities of
publicly funded health care. There is also considerable political tension
underlying health care reform initiatives. Ongoing changes in Canada
and the United States have been viewed by organized medical groups as
a direct assault on their continued abilities to control health policy, and
in both countries the process of health reform is one that sparks frequent
and impassioned debates in the public arena.
This article focuses on how governments in North America are coping
with economic pressures in their health care programs and explores
changes that are ongoing in the Canadian and American systems. It
considers broad changes in health care policy that are occurring in Canada
and the United States. It focuses on financing issues and the growth of
managed care plans, which are the various systems that combine tradi-
tional health insurance with medical care delivery in a single entity. The
article continues with an examination of health care changes at the
regional government level in Nova Scotia and Illinois, concentrating on
jurisdiction-specific reforms in Medicare and Medicaid respectively. It
concludes with observations on the respective national and regional
reform initiatives, and a consideration of which approaches may have
utility across borders.
1. See generally, M.W. Raffel, ed., Health Care and Reform in Industrialized Countries
(University Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997).
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I. Canadian Health Care
1. General Arrangements
Public health insurance remains one of the core pillars of Canadian
society and is viewed by many as one of Canada's major national
accomplishments. 2 Founded in the late 1960s, the Canadian Medicare
program came into being at a time of national growth and prosperity, and
within five years of the passage of the Medical Care Act3 all ten provinces
were participating in the program.4 The provinces oversee the adminis-
tration of health insurance and the delivery of services, so in essence
Medicare is really composed of ten provincial and two territorial plans.5
In theory, the binding elements in the system are the five principles first
spelled out in the 1968 Medical Care Act (public administration, compre-
hensiveness, universality, portability, and accountability) and later reit-
erated in the 1984 Canada Health Act.6
In practice, the individual plans all have similar components: a hospital
plan, a medical services component and a pharmaceutical plan. With the
exception of indigents, a wide range of services, such as long term care,
are not covered.7 For health insurance to be provided, the service in
question must be demonstrated as one that is "medically necessary" and
the provincial plans have the authority to declare services outside the
boundaries of medical necessity.8 Provinces generally reimburse physi-
cians in a fee-for-service manner on the basis of negotiated or mandated
fee schedules, although capitated payment is beginning to enter the
system, and under the dictates of the Canada Health Act physician
balance billing is outlawed.' Hospital operating expenses are paid annu-
ally by means of a global budget and a separate process exists for
institutional capital financing."0
2. Conference of Provincial/Territorial Ministers of Health, A Renewed Vision for Canada's
Health System (Ottawa: Ministerial Council on Social Policy Renewal, 1997) at 1-2; M.Janigan,
"A Prescription for Medicare" Macleans (31 July 1995); D. Frum, "Medicare's Critical
Condition" Toronto Sun (7 December 1996) 11.
3. R.S.C. 1970, c. M-8, repealed by S.C. 1984, c. 6, s. 32.
4. J.M. Fulton, Canada's Health Care System: Bordering on the Possible (New York: Health
Care Information Centre, 1993) at 49-50; P. Armstrong & H. Armstrong, Wasting Away: The
Undermining of Canadian Health Care (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1996) at 158-159;
M. Rachlis, Strong Medicine: How To Save Canada's Health Care System (Toronto:
HarperCollins, 1994) at 32-39.
5. Armstrong & Armstrong, ibid. at 158-159.
6. Canada Health Act, R.S.C. 1984, c. C-6, ss. 8-12.
7. A Renewed Vision, supra note 2 at 1.
8. Armstrong & Armstrong,supra note 4 at 180-81; S. MacKinlay, "Got Warts? Dig Out Your
Wallet" The [Halifax] Daily News (31 January 1997) 2.
9. Supra note 6.
10. Armstrong & Armstrong, supra note 4 at 65-66.
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Like any complex system, Canadian health care is one that can be
analyzed at several different levels; structural, legal, political, economic,
social and cultural. These levels are all intertwined and serve as a
backdrop to public need and the current realities of medical science. It is
perhaps too easy to succumb to the temptation of trying to understand
government programs strictly in economic terms, but in the case of
Canadian Medicare, as with U.S. health care, economics has taken centre
stage. Many of the recent federal and provincial policy initiatives in
health care are in direct response to diminishing resources in the public
sector." While quality and access questions are still central to the future
of Canadian health care, they are now being addressed primarily in the
context of health care finances and, more broadly, of provincial budgets.
Beyond the ebb and flow of deficit and revenue politics, the very core of
Canada's Medicare program concerns the financial relationship between
the federal and provincial governments. Medicare has evolved around a
scheme that requires joint federal/provincial funding. Under this scheme,
Ottawa has paid the provinces a cash contribution for insured health
services and amounts payable for extended health services.'"
According to the Canada Health Act, federal money that is used in
provincial health plans is conditioned on a province adhering to the core
principles noted in the Act, supplying requisite health care information to
Ottawa, and giving the federal government public credit for its contribu-
tions. 3 In the event a province fails to meet the dictates of the Canada
Health Act, and is unwilling to change its noncompliant policies, the
federal Minister of Health may refer the matter to the Governor General
in Council. 4 The Governor General, in turn, may direct that "cash
contributions" or "amounts payable" be reduced or withdrawn until the
breach of federal health policy is corrected."' Also under the Act, as noted,
a province must not allow extra billing or user fees if it is to remain eligible
for cash contributions. 6 In the event a province permits extra billing or
user fees, the federal government can deduct those amounts from federal
contributions. In reality it is unclear how effective the Canada Health Act
is in binding the provincial health insurance plans to a national system.
With the decrease in overall federal funding levels, the threat of financial
11. A. DePalma, "Canadian Health Care in Crisis: High Costs Hit Hard at System Held
Sacred" The State [Springfield, IL] Journal Register (15 December 1996) 6.
12. P. Boothe & B. Johnston, Stealing the Emperor's Clothes: Deficit Off-loading and
National Standards in Health Care (Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute, 1993) at 3.
13. Canada Health Act, R.S.C. 1984, c. C-6, ss. 7, 13.
14. Ibid., s. 13.
15. Ibid.
16. Supra note 6.
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penalty may not be enough to hold the provinces in line. 7 As Canada
struggles with finding a balance between regional and national identities,
the future of large-scale federal legislation such as the Canada Health Act
will be greatly affected by political and cultural change as well.,8
2. Changing Financial Structure
Historically the Medicare program was funded on the basis of equal
shares, but that arrangement was viewed by the federal government as too
open-ended, and the provinces saw it as leading to excessive federal
involvement in their plans. 19 In 1977 Ottawa enacted the Federal-
Provincial Fiscal Arrangements and Established Programs Financing
Act which converted health and social service programming into a block
grant system.E° Under Established Program Financing (EPF) the federal
government provided a per capita contribution to the provinces which had
the effect of placing a financial ceiling on health care and social program
contributions, independent of provincial expenditures.' In turn, Ottawa
agreed to make half of its contributions in the form of cash transfers, and
relinquished some tax points (share of income tax power) to the prov-
inces, making it possible for them to obtain the other part of the federal
match through tax revenue. Under EPF the federal transfer was to
increase yearly according to an escalator clause based on population
growth and gross domestic product. 2 As a result of deficit politics,
however, the federal government reduced the escalator payment starting
in 1986, and eventually froze EDF cash grants for the period 1990 to
1995.3 This leveling of transfer payments occurred at a time when
individual provincial deficits were growing and overall health care
expenditures had increased by 42%.24
In 1995 the Federal Budget Implementation Act abolished EDF and
amended the Canada Health Act by combining cash contributions and
amounts payable into a single payment, as well as by widening the
17. P.S. Taylor, "Bye, Bye, Bytown: Decentralization of the Canadian Government" Satur-
day Night (December 1996) 19.
18. M. Campbell, "Nationalism Dips at the Dawn of Global Era" Globe & Mail (1 July
1997)D1.
19. Rachlis, supra note 4 at 36.
20. Federal-Provincial Fiscal Arrangements and Established Program Financing Act,
1977, S.C. 1976-77 c. 10, as am. by Federal-Provincial Arrangements and Federal Post-
Secondary Education and Health Contributions Act, R.S.C., 1985 c. F-8.
21. Boothe & Johnston, supra note 12 at 3.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid. at 5.
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definition of cash contributions.2 5 Under the new law, the federal health,
education and social service funds were combined into a single block
fund; the Canada Health and Social Transfer (CHST ).26 As a result of this
re-arrangement the provinces will have more flexibility to design their
own social assistance programs, but they must still adhere to the national
standards of the Canada Health Act. The practical implications of
moving to the CHST are a $7 billion dollar cut in total entitlements in the
1996-97 fiscal year, followed by an additional $4.5 billion reduction in
1997-1998.7 These block grants will result in a decline in federal cash
payments to the provinces of $3.5 billion in 1996-97 and $6.0 billion the
following year, and while the CHST will not phase out cash contribu-
tions, they will be restricted for the foreseeable future. 8
The CHST is composed of three parts, a notional tax transfer (tax
points), an equalization factor to offset provincial tax disparities, and a
cash transfer.29 The cash transfer is not a major part of the overall transfer
but is designed to act as a residual payment to meet the total entitlement.
The 1996 federal budget set out a five year schedule for provincial
allocations that was designed to result in an equal per capita transfer.
30
The difficulty that the present CHST scheme raises is the creation of
disparities in cash payments to the provinces, resulting in large provinces
losing considerable amounts in federal support.3 While federal cash
transfers will eventually increase after 2000, it will take several years for
British Columbia, Ontario and Alberta to receive amounts equal to 1995
levels .
32
It has been suggested that with the growth of tax points the provinces
have actually seen an increase in federal transfers, but that position does
not reflect the sentiments of provincial governments .3" While tax points
may have increased, the provinces argue that there is still a need for
growth in cash transfers, and that the ability to provide health and social
programs has been hurt by the shrinkage of federal cash allocations.34
25. Budget Implementation Act, S.C. 1995, c. 17.
26. Ibid.
27. S. Durkan, "Richest Provinces Benefit: Funding for Social Programs Linked to Popula-
tion" Toronto Sun (7 March 1996) 5. For a detailed discussion of CHST see K. Boessenkool,
The Illusion of Equality: Provincial Distribution of the Canada Health and Social Transfer
(Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute, 1996); Armstrong & Armstrong, supra note 4 at 159.
28. Boessenkool, ibid.
29. Ibid.
30. Ontario, Ministry of Finance, "Federal Transfers to Ontario" (26 July 1996) at 3
[unpublished].
31. Ibid. at 5. See also Durkan, supra note 27.
32. Durkan, supra note 27. See also Boessenkool, supra note 7.
33. Boothe & Johnston, supra note 12 at 3.
34. Boessenkool, supra note 27.
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While each province has followed different avenues in grappling with
reduced federal support and increased health care demands, certain
commonalities in the approaches taken can be identified. As administra-
tors of provincial health plans have considerably more power than their
American counterparts, they have taken steps to utilize that authority to
make programmatic changes affecting the structure of delivery systems,
individual and institutional provider reimbursement, and human resource
components .
3. Responses from the Field
The most typical response of provincial governments to the pressures of
rising health care cost was to place a cap on overall expenditures. For
implementation, the provinces developed specific spending caps for
physician reimbursement and hospital budgets.16 In the physician area
provincial policy makers froze physician fees at various times,developed
sliding reimbursement scales to limit increases in volume, and restricted
the issuance of new billing numbers in "over- doctored" areas. 37 By and
large the physician cost containment strategies have met with limited
success because in a fee-for-service system, individual doctors have
considerable autonomy to adjust their practices to maximize earning
capacity .38
In the hospital sector, provincial policies have resulted in dramatic
changes. There are many instances nationwide where respective provin-
cial health ministries mandated hospital mergers and closures, and
applied a broader, regional view to health care services generally. 39 In
addition to hospital closures and mergers, provincial policies have
resulted in staff downsizing, use of expanded contract services, shifts
toward outpatient services and day surgery, and the implementation of
stringent policies on purchasing new equipment or making capital
expenditures. 4° Departments of health have refocused their respective
health systems into community health models, and while such efforts are
laudable for public health purposes, they can also be seen as attempts to
shift provincial Medicare programs into lower-cost delivery arenas. In
35. Armstrong & Armstrong, supra note 4 at 64-66.
36. Ibid. at 65.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid. at 64, 168, 169.
39. D. Eisler, "When A Hospital Dies" Macleans (28 April 1997) 28; R. Lewis, "The Toast
of New Brunswick" Macleans (9 September 1996) 2.
40. Armstrong & Armstrong, supra note 4 at 66-88.
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the labour area, provinces have had to negotiate contract agreements with
health care unions which mitigate the impacts of downsizing by offering
early retirement, opportunities for retraining, and promises of new jobs
in community health programs.4 The realities of cost containment have
been difficult for labour groups, for, in an era of deficit reduction, unions
have had to be conciliatory to prevent massive job cuts.
The politics of Medicare are such that indefinite cost cutting cannot
continue unabated, as Alberta discovered when it sought to make $750
million dollars of cuts. Its plans were thwarted by a wildcat strike of
hospital workers, which mirrored public concerns about the viability of
that province's Medicare program.4 2 Recent provincial Medicare policies
have more carefully weighed public tolerance for further cuts to the
system, and that posture is, in part, justified by stronger economies and
the abatement of deficit crises. On the federal level, health care funding
has actually increased, and in the provinces, funding for certain pro-
grams, particularly in children's health care, has increased as well." This
is not to say, however, that provincial health reforms are over, but if fiscal
pressures continue to abate as a result of revenue growth, future changes
will be more cautiously made so as not to hamper the public's perception
of program integrity, and not to create opportunities for further politiciz-
ing health care reform.
4. The Future
In ascertaining future directions for provincial health policies, two recent
reports, one drafted by the Conference of Ministers of Health and the
other by the National Forum on Health, provide insight." The Ministers'
report expresses concern about the impacts of rapid change on health care
quality, resulting from policies necessitated by shortfalls in federal
transfers.4 5 The report endorses the continuation of a publicly funded
system, but argues for adequate, predictable and sustainable federal
funding, and more effective integration of health with economic and
social policy.46 Within the health enterprise, the ministers recommend a
system organized around four primary components: personal health
41. Rachlis, supra note 4 at 300-301.
42. Taylor, supra note 17 at 41.
43. A. Dawson, "$400M Boost For Medicare" Toronto Sun (19 February 1997) 41.
44. Conference of Provincial/Territorial Ministers of Health, supra note 2; National Forum
on Health, Canada Health Action: Building on the Legacy (Ottawa: National Forum on Health,
1997).
45. Conference of Provincial/Territorial Ministers of Health, supra note 2 at 7.
46. Ibid. at 8.
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services, population-based services, support services and health promo-
tion. The report stresses the need for clarifying the roles of government
at the provincial and federal levels, and recommends the development of
an administrative mechanism that can act as a national resource on health
policy and funding issues, as well as a forum to mediate intergovernmen-
tal disputes.4"
The National Forum report is the result of a two year study of the
Canadian health system by a group of 24 individuals appointed by the
Prime Minister in 1994.48 On a broad level, the Forum's final report states
that the health prospects of Canadians could be improved by creating
more favourable economic and social environments, and to that end it
recommends income and social service supports for families and chil-
dren .9 More specific recommendations call for restructuring the funding
and delivery of primary care, and bringing home care and Pharmacare
programs under the umbrella of public health insurance. 0 Like the
Ministers' report, the Forum endorses the continuation of public financ-
ing of health care and underscores the need for better coordination at the
policy level between provincial and federal government. Both reports call
for major systematic changes and it is difficult to predict which specific
reform recommendations will penetrate fiscal and political barriers.
However, there is already some movement towards experimenting with
broader home care and pharmacy coverage, and it is likely that other
proposals in the two documents will take root.
II. Health Care South of the Border
1. Failure of Government Reform
With great fanfare, U.S. President Clinton introduced the Health Security
Act in 1994 which was designed by a committee of 500 to bring order to
America's patchwork health care system and, in the process, to provide
health insurance to the millions of Americans who lack coverage.5 The
legislation guaranteed universal coverage, choice, and pluralism in the
delivery system through publicly sponsored purchasing cooperatives.
47. Ibid. at 9.
48. National Forum on Health, supra note 44.
49. Ibid., s. 2.
50. Ibid., ss. 1,2.2.
51. Julie Rovner, "Congress and Health Care Reform 1993-94" in T.E. Mann & N.J.
Ornstein, eds., Intensive Care: How Congress Shapes Health Policy (Washington, D.C.:
American Enterprise Institute, 1995).
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The Clinton bill was noteworthy for its scope and complexity, but its
reliance on an expanded role for government regulators engendered
opposition from most sectors of the health care industry.52
Numerous theories have been posited by political and health policy
pundits about why the Clinton health reform effort failed. There seems to
be some consensus that the President lacked the necessary popular
mandate for such a sweeping change, and that the Congressional Demo-
crats were not well enough organized to meet challenges on health issues
from a very unified Republican opposition. 3 While there was a certain
level of consensus among the public that health care needed to be
reformed, the massive redistributive effort proposed under the Clinton
plan lacked support from the American middle class, the majority of
whom receive health care coverage through employer plans. The
President's health bill was literally picked apart by health care lobby
groups and, with the failure of the Health Security Act and the Republican
capture of the Congress in 1994, the chance for any meaningful, large-
scale health reform was lost.
2. Emergence of Managed Care
With the demise of the Clinton plan, the momentum for reform shifted to
the corporate purchaser side where costs have always been the dominant
concern. Large employers who provide health benefits to workers and
dependents have used their purchasing power to shift U.S. health care
away from fee-for-service medicine to managed care systems.54 Outside
of government, corporate America constitutes the major purchaser of
health care insurance, and so changes in their policies can result in
dramatic alterations of this market. In addition to the support given to
managed care plans through corporate benefit departments, the federal
government sponsors of U.S. Medicare and Medicaid programs have
taken major steps to promote managed care products to enrollees in public
programs.55 The extensive and rapid growth of managed care medicine in
both the private and public sectors has brought about defacto reform of
52. Ibid.
53. Allen Schick, "How a Bill Did Not Become a Law" in Mann & Ornstein, ibid.
54. Eli Ginzberg & Miriam Ostow, "Managed Care - A Look Back and A Look Ahead"
(1997)336 New Eng. J. Med. 1018-1020; "The State of Health Care in America 1996" Business
& Health Magazine (1996).
55. Physician Payment Review Commission, Annual Report to Congress 1997, chapters 1,
2, 20; George Anders, "Many States Embrace Managed Care System for Medicaid Patients"
Wall St. J. (11 June 1993) Al. The Clinton administration has encouraged states to shift
Medicaid patients into mandatory managed care by directing the federal Health Care Financing
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the American health care system that in many ways is as profound as the
reforms which the Clinton plan would have ushered in.
Managed care is a catch-all phrase that covers a wide range of health
care programs and entities which have formed in response to those
programs .56 On the programmatic level, managed care refers to a variety
of health care plans which combine traditional insurance coverage with
medical care delivery. Most typical of the managed care plans are Health
Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) which provide enrollees with a
comprehensive range of medical services for a set monthly fee, with very
limited copayment requirements.57 HMO plan enrollees are restricted by
plan rules that generally require use of plan physicians and prior approv-
als for specialty care. Failure of the HMO enrollees to follow plan rules
can result in denials of payment for treatment, thus forcing the patient to
pay for all, or a high portion, of the care received.
There are several types of HMOs ranging from staff models, which
directly employ physicians and may own all their medical facilities, to
network models, which are composed of medical groups dispersed
throughout a particular locale and bound by contract to an HMO corpo-
ration. 8 HMOs are licensed state entities, and under state legislation
significant capitalization requirements must be complied with, akin to
requirements insurance companies must meet.59 Another popular man-
aged care model is the Preferred Provider Organization (PPO). It is a plan
that offers employer purchasers discounted medical services in arrange-
ments with organizations which coniract with particular physician groups
and institutional health care providers. Unlike HMOs, PPOs are not
heavily regulated and structurally are contract entities put together most
typically by large health insurers. The newest generation of managed care
Administration (HCFA) to grant the necessary administrative waivers of requirements in the
Medicaid statutes. See Teresa A. Couglin et al., Medicaid Since 1980: Cost, Coverage and the
Shifting Alliance Between the Federal Government and the States (Washington, DC: Brookings,
1994). By 1994 at least 23% of Medicaid recipients were enrolled in managed care. Colette
Froley, "Managed Care May Save Money, But Hard to Say How Much" (1995) 53 Cong. Of
Wkly. Rep. 2905. The 1995 comprehensive budget bill urged Medicare beneficiaries to join
managed care through a"Medicare Part C" program with the expectation of saving close to $25
billion over the 7 year budget program. Section 863 of the Balanced Budget Act of 1995, 104th
Cong. 1 st Session, discussed in H.R.Rep. no. 350, 104th Cong., I st Session, pt. 2, at 1267-71
(1995).
56. Carl H. Hitchner et al., "Integrated Delivery Systems: A Survey of Organizational
Models" 29 Wake Forest L. Rev. 273 n.1 (1994); see generally Thomas A. Gilman,Alternative
Delivery Systems (Frederick, Md.: Aspen Publishers, 1986).
57. George J. Annas, American Health Law (Boston: Little, Brown, 1990) at 774-75; see also
Stephen B. Boochever, "Health Maintenance Organizations" in Gilman, ed., supra note 56.
58. Boochever, ibid.
59. Michael F. Anthony, "Preferred Provider Organization" in Gilman, ed., supra note 56.
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plans are Provider Sponsored Organizations (PSO) which are physician/
hospital corporations that assemble and manage a network of medical
care services through contract arrangements .60 Unlike most Health Main-
tenance Organizations or Preferred Provider Organizations, the PSO
directly provides medical care services. The control of these entities is in
the hands of medical professionals, which, proponents argue, results in
better utilization of services and improvement in clinical outcomes. At
this point, however, it is too early to assess the medical care successes of
these new organizations.
While a sense of managed care can be developed from a study of the
various structures in the field, there are a number of operational elements
which are seen in most managed care arrangements, regardless of the
specific structure. A capstone of managed care is capitation reimburse-
ment in which physicians, typically primary care doctors, receive a set
payment per member, per month, regardless of whether or not the
individual patient member receives treatment. A percentage of a doctor's
capitation amount is held in a fund to pay for specialty care and often a
second withhold fund is created to pay physicians bonuses for reaching
specific utilization targets. 6' In a sense, the capitated doctor takes on the
dual roles of practitioner and insurer, as the individual clinician acts as a
gatekeeper in determining whether there is a need for more intensive
clinical and diagnostic services. Inherent in the capitation system is a
transfer of risk from the managed care entity to the member doctor, and
the issue of how an individual practitioner can best manage risk is one of
frequent concern. 6" Capitation is not universal to all managed care
arrangements in that some reimburse primary care doctors on a dis-
counted fee-for-service basis, and this type of payment is particularly
common for reimbursement of medical specialists .63 Other hallmarks of
managed care include restricted access to medical specialists and costly
procedures, as well as the application of stringent clinical treatment
60. Edward B. Hirshfeld, "Provider Sponsored Organizations and Provider Service Net-
works Rationale and Regulation" (1996) 22 Am. J. L. & Med. 263.
61. See generally Frances H. Miller, "Foreword: The Promises and Problems of Capitation"
(1996) 22 Am. J. L. & Med. 167 at 169; see Health Care Consultants of America, Physicians
Guide to Managed Care: A Comprehensive Guide to Capitation, Discounted Fee-For-
Services and Integrated Delivery Systems (Augusta, Ga.: H.C.C.A., 1996).
62. Miller, supra note 61 at 168.
63. PPOs (Preferred Provider Organizations), for example, are networks of fee-for-service
providers that have agreed to grant large, third party payers price discounts in return for
insurance contracts that steer the insured toward these "preferred" providers through specially
tailored forms of cost sharing; Annas, supra note 57 at 775.
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protocols which often shift medical care from inpatient settings to
ambulatory treatment.
3. Market Developments
In response to the growth of managed care plans there has been a dramatic
alteration of many local health care markets as individual and institu-
tional providers are reorganizing to become viable contracting parties.'4
As health care is largely a local enterprise, the nature of reorganization
varies around the country, but even in markets where managed care
penetration is minimal, hospitals are forming local area acute and
ambulatory care networks with other institutions. Many hospitals have
created joint venture corporations with members of their own medical
staffs, referred to as Physician Hospital Organizations (PHO). 65 These
organizations are usually designed to provide a comprehensive range of
medical services and to enter into contracts with managed care plans, or
to provide services directly to employer groups. In fact, PHOs are a
variation of the Provider Sponsored Organizations previously discussed.
In areas where managed care is more developed, affiliated networks of
hospitals and doctors tend to dominate, and in order to attract business,
independent providers are forced into established or newly developed
network arrangements. 66 Presumably, health care markets are evolving
toward integrated delivery systems that will be characterized by local and
regional health care corporations which will provide a full range of
medical services from ambulatory care to inpatient services to long term
care. The hope is that this market realignment will bring order from chaos.
It is too soon to predict whether the forecasts about the likely dominance
of integrated delivery systems will be realized, but clearly more market
alterations are occurring in American health care in the 1990s than in any
prior period.
Commensurate with market restructuring are numerous legal consid-
erations inherent to the development and operation of managed care
plans, as well as issues sparked by corporate reorganizations .67 As might
64. Anne Stoline & Jonathan P. Weiner, The New Medical Marketplace: A Physician's Guide
to the Health Care Revolution (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988).
65. Mike Mitka, "What Makes a PHO Go?" American Medical News (20 June 1994) 15.
Frederick B. Abbey & K. Michael Treash Jr., "Reasons Providers Form PHOs" (1995) 49
Healthcare Financial Management 38-48.
66. Mark A. Hall, "Managed Competition and Integrated Health Care Delivery Systems"
(1994) 29 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1.
67. See generally, "New Forms of Hospital and Business Structures and Professional
Arrangements as Influenced by Taxes, Competition, and Health Care Reform" C 884 ALI-
ABA 595 (10 February 1994).
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be expected, paramount among the legal issues are matters concerning
contract law, but a myriad of other business and insurance law concerns
arise as well .68 For example, with mergers and affiliations of institutional
health providers there have been increased concerns about antitrust law
violations .69
Starting in the mid-1970s, antitrust laws have been applied to health
care in a series of public and private actions dealing with questions of
professionalism and competition, physician-hospital arrangements and,
more recently, provider-payor relationships. 70 Challenges have been
raised against market realignments in which federal/state statutory vio-
lations such as restraint of trade, price fixing and monopolization were
alleged. Government antitrust enforcement has spawned considerable
confusion in the private sector, forcing regulators to identify certain
transactions that will not result in legal violations, but the so-called "safe
harbours" developed by the U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal
Trade Commission are not comprehensive or binding.71 It has been
argued that the actual deterrent effect of antitrust laws on health care
market reorganization has been minimal .72 The fact is that few successful
antitrust challenges have been mounted. Cases in this area often fail as
result of inherent legal complexities and difficulties in defining the
relevant product market. Still, it seems short-sighted to overlook the
impact of antitrust laws in health care, since virtually every health care
transaction must be subjected to an antitrust litmus test, and undoubtedly
many health care restructuring arrangements have been abandoned
because of concerns over antitrust enforcement.
In addition to antitrust developments, considerable legislative activity
has been spawned by managed care. This activity has been promoted by
a unique coalition of physicians and consumers who have targeted their
68. See, Gerald R. Peters, ed., Healthcare Integration: A Legal Manual for Constructing
Integrated Organizations (Washington, DC: National Health Lawyers, 1995).
69. For an overview, see Jonathan Choslovsky, "Note and Comment: Agency Review of
Health Care Industry Mergers: Proper Procedure or Unnecessary Burden?" (1996) 10 Admin.
L. J. 291 at 298-309.
70. Mark A. Hall & William S. Brewbarker, eds., Health Care Corporate Law Facilities and
Transactions (Boston: Little Brown, 1996), ss. 5.19-5.25.
71. U.S. Dept of Justice, U.S. Federal Trade Commission, Statements of Antitrust Enforce-
ment Policy in Health Care, 5 BNA Health L. Rep. 1295, 1307-1310 (29 August 1996),
Statements of Enforcement Policy and Analytical Principles Relating to Health Care and
Antitrust (1994), Statements of Antitrust Enforcement Policy for Health Care Areas (1993).
72. Marc A. Rodwin, "Patient Accountability and Quality of Care: Lessons from Medical
Consumerism and the Patients' Rights, Women's Health and Disability Rights Movements"
(1994) 20 Am. J. L. & Med. 147 at 154.
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efforts against a growing list of perceived abuses.73 Typifying a growing
number of federal and state initiatives (known as patient protection acts)
are statutes which prohibit so-called "gag clauses." These clauses are
restrictions that some managed care plans have placed on physicians
providing enrollees information about non-covered services and incen-
tive payment arrangements.74 To date it has been state legislatures which
have taken the lead in managed care patient legislation, reflecting the fact
that the underlying issues have become matters that have political
resonance with local politicians. There is also an increasing number of
lawsuits being brought against managed care plans by disgruntled con-
sumers, and barriers to such litigation as a result of federal benefit law
preemptions to tort actions are beginning to erode.75 The federal govern-
ment has joined in the fray with the creation of a presidential panel, the
Advisory Commission on Consumer Protection and Quality in the Health
Care Industry which primarily has a managed care focus, and a series of
Congressional bills which mirror the state patient protection acts. The
commission issued a model bill of rights which includes patients' rights
to change doctors, to appeal denials of care and to receive payment of
emergency room services. All of these rights are in areas where antecdotal
evidence of abuses in managed care plans has been presented. 76
III. A Tale of Two Jurisdictions.
On their face, Nova Scotia and Illinois appear to have little in common
other than the fact they are both regional jurisdictions in North America.
Nova Scotia is a small, relatively homogeneous province with a single
metropolitan area.7 7 Illinois, on the other hand, is a large state with a very
diverse population dominated by Chicago, a metropolitan region of over
six million people.78 While general comparisons between the two juris-
dictions are a stretch, there are commonalities in the area of publicly
73. For a detailed list of state and federal legislative activity in this area, see Marc A. Rodwin,
"Mechanisms of Consumer Protection - The Marketplace and Regulation: Managed Care and
Consumer Protection: What are the issues?" (1996) 26 Seton Hall L. Rev. 1007 at 1029-1032.
74. See, e.g., Mass. Gen. L. ch. 176B, 7 (Supp. 1996); ch. 176G, 6; ch. 1761,2; Alison Bass,
"New Law Bans Gag Rules on Doctors: Health Insurers Contracts at Issue" Boston Globe (23
January 1996) 1.
75. Seema R. Shah, "Loosening ERISA's Preemptive Grip on HMO Medical Malpractice
Claims: A Response to PacifiCare of Oklahoma v. Burrage" (1996) 80 Minn. L. Rev. 1545.
76. "Medical Bill of Rights Could Lead to New Laws" Chicago Tribune (21 October 1997);
Robert Pear, "Panel of Experts Urges Broadening of Patient Rights" New York Times (23
October 1997).
77. KCWD, "Nova Scotia: General Information" (ABC-CLIO, 1995).
78. George Ryan, ed., Illinois Blue Book 1995-96 (Secretary of State, 1995).
374 The Dalhousie Law Journal
sponsored health insurance which make comparative analyses valuable.
For this article, the bases of comparison are Nova Scotia Medicare and
Illinois Medicaid. Medicaid is the American program for indigent care,
and while it is not representative of the entire state health system, it shares
many common features with Nova Scotia's province wide Medicare
program .79
79. Medicaid is jointly funded by the states and the federal government. The federal share of
expenditures is determined by a formula based on state per capita income, under which states
with relatively low per capita incomes receive higher federal matching rates. For example,
Mississippi, with a per capita income that is less than 70 percent of the national average, had
a matching rate of about 79 percent, while Connecticut, with a per capita income that is nearly
135 percent of the national average, received a 50 percent match. Since 1987, this matching rate
has been recalculated annually. Overall, federal funds accounted for about 57 percent of total
Medicaid spending in 1995.
Federal payments to the states are provided from general revenues to match expenditures
submitted by the states. There is no limit on the total amount of federal payments. States may
finance their share entirely from state funds or require local governments to finance up to 60
percent of program costs. Only a few states have exercised the latter option, with local sources
accounting for a small proportion of state financing in most of these states.
Overall, Medicaid helps to finance health care for one of every eight Americans and about
one-half of all Americans living in poverty. There is, however, no uniform national basis for
establishing Medicaid eligibility. Within the limits of various federal rules, states may choose
different eligibility criteria.
In general, beneficiaries can be grouped in three categories: adults and children in low-
income families, blind and disabled individuals, and the elderly. Within each category, people
may qualify for coverage because they are either categorically or medically needy.
Under federal law, all persons meeting 1996 standards for Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC) and most on Supplementary Security Income (SSI) are consid-
ered categorically needy and covered in all states. Starting in the mid-1980's, the Congress
expanded Medicaid eligibility to include some persons who do not receive AFDC or SSI cash
payments. For the most part, different income standards apply to each of three newly eligible
groups: pregnant women and infants, children below the age of six, and children six and older.
States have considerable flexibility in setting age and income thresholds. As a result of these
expansions, the proportion of Medicaid beneficiaries who also received cash welfare benefits
declined from about two-thirds in 1990 to just over half in 1995.
States also may give Medicaid eligibility to the medically needy, those individuals whose
income or resources exceed standards for cash assistance but who meet a separate state-
determined income standard and are also aged, disabled, or a member of a family with
dependent children. Persons who "spend down" income and assets due to large health expenses
may qualify as medically needy. In 1996,34 states extended eligibility to the medically needy.
In addition to Medicaid, citizens of Illinois who are 65 years and older (as well as
individuals with certain disabilities) participate in the federal Medicare program. Medicare is
a medical care insurance program covering a wide range of inpatient and ambulatory care,
funded through Social Security taxes and general revenue. Unlike Medicaid , there is no direct
state government involvement in the administration of Medicare, and even though Medicare
primarily covers the elderly, it provides only limited coverage for long term care.
On the private side, most Illinois residents receive health care insurance through
employer plans which range from traditional indemnity offerings to various managed care
options. Very few individuals in Illinois purchase insurance privately as the costs of doing so
are prohibitively high.
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Both jurisdictions face serious economic challenges in meeting the
legislative mandates underpinning their respective Medicare and Medic-
aid programs. In both cases, there has been a movement to devolve public
health from federal to regional governments, and the intergovernmental
relationships are strained by politics, economics and a lack of clarity
about appropriate system-wide directions. Nova Scotia and Illinois are
both in the throes of implementing major changes in health policies, and
while the nature of those changes are a reflection of two very different
societies, successful initiatives in public health are likely to have cross-
border implications.
1. Nova Scotia
a. Overview of Medicare
Like other provinces, Nova Scotia's Medicare is composed of three
primary components: hospital coverage, medical services insurance and,
for the elderly and poor, pharmacy benefits.80 Core hospital and medical
services are provided without charge but an annual premium and
copayment is applied to the Pharmacare benefit. 8 There is a charge for
other health services, such as long term care and home care, but the
Department of Health provides payment in these areas for low income
residents. From a structural standpoint, the province's 47 hospitals and
2000 physicians form the core of the delivery system, but in response to
severe financial pressures, there is an increasing focus on community
health services, particularly home care.82 While institutional and indi-
vidual providers are largely private, their funding is predominantly
public. The provincial government funds its health system through a
complex blend of provincial and federal dollars drawn from sales and
income tax revenues and federal transfer payments.8 3 Proprietary health
care services have made few inroads in the province, although with the
delisting of government reimbursed services, the potential for growth of
the for-profit sector is a real one. Some private health insurance is offered
through employer programs covering services that fall outside the pro-
vincial Medicare program."
80. Hospitals Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 208, as am. by S.N.S. 1994-95, c. 7, ss. 11-16,22-33;
Medical Act. R.S.N.S.1989, c. 278, as am. by S.N.S. 1993 c. 28.
81. C. Nicoll, "Pharmacare Costs Down, Exec. says" The [Halifax] Daily News (13 February
1997)4.
82. Nova Scotia Department of Health, Minister's Action Committee on Health System
Reform, Nova Scotia's Blueprint for Health System Reform (Halifax: Dept. Of Health, 1994).
83. Fulton, supra note 4.
84. For example, supplemental health coverage can be provided through programs such as
the one offered by Nova Scotia Blue Cross.
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Health policy in Nova Scotia, as is the case in other Canadian
provinces, is intertwined with financial considerations. In particular,
deficit spending and tax policy both have a profound impact on provincial
social services.85 Economic issues affecting Nova Scotia are multifaceted
and complex, and beyond the scope of this article, but it does seems
reasonable to conclude that the province has been plagued by financial
problems that are both national and regional in their etiology, and many
recent health care initiatives, in large part, have as much to do with
economics as health. In the 1980s, as a result of a serious recession, Nova
Scotia imposed tax increases to restore government revenue levels, but
the balance between provincial spending and revenue was never equal-
ized and thus deficit spending grew.86 By 1993 Nova Scotia's annual
deficit was $617 million and by 1996 the total provincial debt was $8.7
billion.87 Adding to Nova Scotia's financial woes was the federal policy
to cut transfer payments, resulting from Ottawa's adoption of the new
Canada Health and Social Transfer payment system.88 These grim eco-
nomic realities have resulted in stringent provincial spending controls
which have led to a balanced budget in all areas but health care.8 9
In analyzing recent Nova Scotia health policy, two distinct areas can
be identified. First, there has been a visible reform process highlighted by
several widely publicized reports which lay out broad recommendations
for restructuring the provincial health system .9o The second area concerns
the ongoing regulatory initiatives pursued by the Nova Scotia Depart-
ment of Health to reduce costs and eventually restructure the delivery
system. This process has often proceeded outside of general public
scrutiny. In an ideal world, the aspirational goals outlined in provincial
planning documents should complement the policies of the Department
of Health, but it appears that this may not be the case.
b. Recent Alterations: Cost Cutting
Recent initiatives of the Nova Scotia Department of Health have focused
on the creation of a province wide ambulance service and a home health
85. Nova Scotia Department of Finance, Government By Design: Building on Solid Ground
(Halifax: Dept. of Finance, 1996) at 81.
86. Nova Scotia Department of Finance, Shaping the Future Positioning Nova Scotia for a
Financially Secure Tomorrow, vol. 2 (Halifax: Dept. of Finance, 996) at 81.
87. Ibid.
88. Taylor, supra note 7.
89. Government by Design, supra note 85 at 7-8.
90. Nova Scotia's Blueprint, supra note 82 at 8. Details of other provincial health reports are
included here.
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care network.9' However, the bulk of the Department's activity has been
directed to a series of cost cutting measures focused on hospitals, labour
unions and physicians. A major emphasis of Department policy has been
on the control of hospital expenditures which has entailed several facility
closures, cuts in acute care beds and reductions in individual facility
budgets.92 By 1995, the Department had cut more than one- quarter of
Nova Scotia's hospital beds. This action was motivated by a provincial
goal of dropping the acute care bed ratio from 5 per 1000, to 3 per 1000
residents.93 The Department of Health closed two rural hospitals and
converted three facilities two into community health centres and one into
a veterans' hospital.9 4 The Department also initiated two major hospital
mergers. One created the province's largest tertiary-care complex, the
Queen Elizabeth II Health Science Centre, by merging four Halifax
hospitals. 95 The other merged a maternity hospital and a children's
hospital into The IWK Grace Health Centre for Children Women &
Families. It is likely that the Department will continue to recommend
additional hospital mergers and conversions of smaller acute-care facili-
ties into community health centres. Coupled with hospital downsizing
initiatives, there has been a 13 percent drop in hospital admissions, and
a 21 percent decrease in inpatient lengths of stay across the province.96
Starting in 1993 individual hospital budgets were frozen for three
years, then they were decreased by 2 percent for two years, with further
decreases likely. 97 The Queen Elizabeth II Health Sciences Centre, the
province's largest hospital, had its 1997-98 budget cut by $24.9 million,
and the hospital has been directed to eliminate 500 jobs and 200 beds in
the next four years .9 While hospital waiting lists in the province have not
increased as a result of the cuts, patient care services have been affected
by the reductions.99
91. Ibid. at 35. See also T. Regan, "The Road to Wellville: The Overhaul of Nova Scotia's
Health Care. Will it Save the Patient?" The [Halifax] Daily News (6 November 1994) 4.
92. C. Nicoll, "No Room at the Hospital? Hefty Bed Cutbacks to Blame for Health Overload
- NDP" The [Halifax] Daily News (23 September 1995) 6.
93. C. Nicoll, "Stewart Chops $15 Million From Budget: Three Hospitals Slated to Close"
The [Halifax] Daily News (13 May 1994).
94. Ibid.
95. C. Nicoll, "QEII Will Be World Leader, Stewart Says: Final Debate Begins on Bill to
Merge Halifax Hospitals" The [Halifax] Daily News (19 December 1995) 4.
96. Nicoll, supra note 92.
97. For a general sense of funding priorities that relate directly to funding, see Government
by Design, supra note 85.
98. S. MacKinlay, "Deep Cuts for QEII" The [Halifax] Daily News (26 July 1996) 3.
99. C. Nicoll "Surgery Quicker in N.S.," The [Halifax] Daily News (19 November 1996) 3;
S. Aikenhead. "Heading to the Grace Maternity, Count on Bringing Your Own Kleenex" The
[Halifax] Daily News (21 March 1995) 21.
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The government's hospital cuts may have been more contentious if
labour agreements had not been reached with the six unions represented
by the Nova Scotia Association of Health Organizations. In 1994, the
Department offered an early retirement package to health care workers
over 55, estimated to cost the province $44 million, but allowing for the
health care workforce to be downsized by 1000 persons."° A larger
labour adjustment package was devised the following year which offered
early retirement and a voluntary resignation incentive program for Nova
Scotia's 14,000 health workers.' 0l The provincial goal has been to limit
layoffs with no recourse to 10 percent of the workforce, and to shift health
workers, particularly nurses, from acute care to home and community
care settings. 02 A negotiated agreement was struck between labour
unions and the government to provide job transition services for dis-
placed workers through the Nova Scotia Health Service Organization.
Currently it is difficult to determine what overall impact hospital
downsizing has had on the provincial health care workforce. It appears
that job losses have not yet reached projected levels, and the acute care
system has been able to absorb a certain number of displaced workers.
The large scale transfer of nurses from acute care settings into home and
community care has not occurred. Unquestionably downsizing will alter
the health care workforce, but the lack of an immediate and dramatic
impact on health providers may be attributed either to successful govern-
ment and labour strategies, or to the fact that reactions in this sector may
be simply delayed." 3
The third major focus of cost cutting activities in the province has been
directed toward physicians. Physician reimbursement was first frozen in
1991, later it was struck by a 3 percent wage cut for two years and a
subsequent 12.5 percent budgetary reduction for expenditures in this
area." Currently, physician fees are calculated on the basis of a formula
(master units) and individual income is controlled by use of a soft cap
which allows for a sliding scale of billing over a certain dollar amount. 05
The Department of Health has also placed an overall ceiling on a
physician's income which acts as a hard cap that ultimately limits
100. P. Hays & C. Nicoll, "Health Workers Get Goodbye Deal" The [Halifax] Daily News
(8 June 1994) 3.
101. C. Nicoll, "We Don't Have any Targets: Health Job-Cut Deal a Milestone" The
[Halifax] Daily News (21 November 1995) 4.
102. Ibid.
103. Nova Scotia Department of Health, Good Medicine: Securing Doctors' Services for
Nova Scotians (Halifax: Dept. of Health, 1997).
104. "Making Sense of the Budget Numbers" Newsletter of the Medical Society of Nova
Scotia (May 1994) 4.
105. Good Medicine, supra note 103 at 4.
Balancing Regional Government Health Mandates
individual billing. Besides reimbursement control, the Department has
restricted physician practice locations and, until recently, no new physi-
cian billing numbers were issued for the Halifax metropolitan area. These
government restrictions on fees and billing numbers have resulted in an
exodus of doctors from the province, particularly from rural areas .106 To
encourage physicians to remain in Nova Scotia, the Department approved
an agreement with the Medical Society to provide rural physicians with
guaranteed income and a generous benefit package. 107
In the report "Good Medicine: Securing Doctors' Services for Nova
Scotians," the Department of Health conducted a comprehensive exami-
nation of medical practice in the province. 08 The Department recom-
mended that the fee-for-service system be scrapped in favour of a blended
capitation system. 0 9 Under blended capitation, primary care doctors
would be paid a set amount per patient with adjustments made for age and
sex. Incorporated into a capitation scheme would be payment incentives
to encourage physicians to engage in health promotion and preventive
care such as Pap tests and immunizations.110 A cap would be placed on the
numbers of patients who could register with a particular physician.
Certain services such as obstetrics would remain under a fee-for-service
structure, as well as the services of physicians in very rural areas where
patient volumes may be too low to make capitation practical."' In
addition, office-based specialists would continue to be paid on a fee-for-
service basis, and hospital specialists would also continue to be reim-
bursed under the institutional block funding arrangement. The Depart-
ment proposes that capitation be introduced gradually through several
voluntary test sites prior to universal adoption.
In addition to altering the payment structure, the Department is
recommending that physicians be provided with supplemental health
insurance, relief from escalating medical malpractice premiums and
pension plans." '2 To address the shortage of rural physicians, a special
fund for after-hours and weekend care is proposed. Other proposals
include the development of a temporary pool of physicians to provide
relief to rural doctors and the introduction of province-wide telemedicine.
In a recently agreed four-year contract, rural physicians will receive
106. S. MacKinlay ,"Province Ends New MD Freeze" The [Halifax] Daily News (9 January
1997)6.
107. S. MacKinlay, "$8 Million for MDs Gets Cool Response" The [Halifax] Daily News (17
April 1997) 4.
108. Good Medicine, supra note 103 at 4.
109. Ibid. at 9.
110. Ibid. at 15.
111. Ibid. at lO, 14.
112. Ibid. at 12-15.
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payment for on-call duty and, province-wide, doctors will realize an
increase in reimbursement as a result of changes in the master unit
reimbursement formula." 1
3
In its attempt to effect cost reduction, the Department has been
negotiating with the Medical Society to delist a number of elective
medical services. In early 1997 the Department released a list of medical
services which it indicated would no longer be reimbursed under Nova
Scotia Medicare. In prior years the government made certain program-
matic adjustments in areas such as pediatric dentistry and eye care, but the
current delisting of services represents Nova Scotia's first attempt to
constrict the delivery of specific medical care as a matter of explicit
public policy." 14 The Medical Society, which was involved in the nego-
tiations over delisting, did not accept the list of 19 services to be removed
from Medicare, and took the position that no currently offered service
should be delisted if it can be classified as "medically necessary.' '5
Beyond the efforts to contain costs,Nova Scotia health policy has been
evolving within the framework of a public reform process started under
the Conservative government with the appointment of the Royal Com-
mission on Health Care in 1987.116 The Conservative reform group
published a three volume report which reviewed key aspects of the health
system and was followed by a document that outlined a series of reform
proposals." 7 The recommendations for reform were driven by a sense that
the health system had to be moved away from an acute care model to one
rooted in community health. The current Liberal government adopted
Conservative ideas on health reform and in 1994 released a document
entitled Nova Scotia's Blueprint for Health System Reform."' The
Blueprint affirmed the core federal principles of Canadian healthcare and
concurred with the Conservative government's position on the need to
move to a community health model. The Blueprint has become the
Liberal government's roadmap for health policy; many of the recent
policy and regulatory initiatives have been taken in response to its
proposals for reform.
113. Ibid. at 14.
114. Nova Scotia Department of Health, "Policy Release, PR #01/97 - Reinsurance of Fee
Codes" (14 January 1997).
115. MacKinlay,supra note 8.
116. The Report of the Nova Scotia Royal Commission on Health Care (Halifax: The
Commission, 1989).
117. Ibid.
118. Supra note 82.
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c. Devolution
Perhaps the most noteworthy of the Blueprint reforms that are being put
into practice is the current attempt to restructure the health system
through a process of devolution. Under the Blueprint, devolution entails
shifting the system's management from a centralized Department of
Health to regional health authorities. ' 9 According to the Nova Scotia
reform initiatives, both planning and financing of health care as well as
the daily management of facilities and programs will become the respon-
sibility of regional entities. The Blueprint calls for the creation of two new
entities - Community Health Boards and Regional Health Boards.1
20
Presumably these boards will be more sensitive to local health needs and
will be more responsive to public concerns than the previous centralized
system. Through local planning and management processes sparked by
the regional boards, the government hopes to develop a system which is
oriented to a public health model and which will de-emphasize costly
acute care. 2 '
The Community Health Boards (CHB), will focus on health planning
at the local level, with a particular focus on primary care services.
22
Regional Health Boards (RHB), on the other hand, will be responsible for
planning, policy making, funding and evaluation of regional health
needs, all of which activities will be based upon community health plans
formulated by CHBs.'23 The Province's four regional health boards will
be provided with a total funding envelope which they will use to
reimburse institutional and non-fee-for-service individual providers, as
well as health programs (such as public health and drug dependency).
This power will give them considerable leverage within their regions.
24
Under the new scheme, local health facility boards will be abolished and
will be replaced by boards that oversee health institutions across a region,
with the exception of the province's four largest tertiary-care centres.
25
The devolution scheme creating RHBs and CHBs is unique in that the
structure being implemented is a system which will allow reform to
119. Ibid. at 26-29.
120. Ibid.
121. Nova Scotia Department of Health, Minister's Action Committee on Health Reform,
Background Paper on Regional Health Authorities and Community Health Boards (Halifax:
Dept. of Health, 1994).
122. Nova Scotia Department of Health, To Our Good Health: an Introduction to Community
Health Boards (Halifax: Dept. of Health, 1996).
123. Nova Scotia Department of Health, From Blueprint to Building: Renovating Nova
Scotia's Health System (Halifax: Dept. of Health, 1995).
124. Ibid. at 4, 6.
125. Nova Scotia's Blueprint, supra note 82 at 41-45.
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emanate from the community level upwards. The scheme is particularly
noteworthy because Canadian provincial health systems are character-
ized by very strong Departments of Health in which most key decisions
are made. Devolution has occurred in other provinces, but what distin-
guishes the Nova Scotia model is its attempt to formulate policy at the
local level, by contrast to other provinces where local entities merely
carry out directives from central government. Under the Nova Scotia
scheme, the Department of Health retains authority for initiating provin-
cial health policy and legislation, planning tertiary services and province-
wide programs, overseeing information systems and performing health
services research.' 26 But the bulk of the daily activity of managing and
funding the delivery system is transferred to the RHBs under the Blue-
print and the resultant RHB enabling legislation.'27
Since the Blueprint was released in 1994, significant progress has been
made in developing Regional Health Boards, and each of the four regions
has one in place. Under the RHB legislation a series of specific duties are
delineated but the legislation is quite broad in character, thus posing a
challenge to regulators as to how it should be implemented. As a result,
each of the four RHBs has followed a different model-a development
that was not anticipated by Department of Health. For example, one RHB
has focused its efforts on policy and planning. With a lean staff, this RHB
is developing a community-based organization focusing on integration of
existing services. Two RHBs have adopted a corporate model of organi-
zation and function in a manner akin to a health care management firm
overseeing the daily operations of area facilities. The fourth RHB has
adopted a regional program management model.'28
At this point it is too early to predict what impact the RHBs will have
on system reform as they are still being phased in. The CHBs which were
to be created first in the reform process have lagged behind the regional
entities in their development, although now more than half of the CHBs
are beginning to present community health plans. Within three years, the
RHBs will take over the Department's direct funding responsibilities but
the population-based formula they will use for reimbursement has yet to
be finalized. It seems likely that the RHBs will work toward converting
small hospitals into community health centres, particularly in rural areas,
but the extent of their involvement in daily operations is uncertain. The
four RHBs will also need to better coordinate their activities with the
126. Ibid. at 45- 46.
127. Ibid. at 41-45; Regional Health Boards Act, S.N.S. 1994 c. 12.
128. Interview with R. Criddle, Director, Metro Regional Health Board (July 1996);
Interview with A.M. Pellerin, Central Regional Health Board (July 1997).
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Department. There has not been a transfer of departmental civil servants
to regional operations apart from public health and drug dependency
staff, and there is a danger of bureaucratic duplication, and even compe-
tition, between the RHBs and the Department.'2 9
Nova Scotia health reform is clearly moving forward on several fronts,
but like any broad reform it is a difficult process, burdened by politics and
financial constraints. The Department of Health, unlike other govern-
ment departments, has not been able to balance its budget, further
magnifying the need for continued cost cutting and adding credibility to
those who remain skeptical about the government's abilities to manage
the reform process. While it is certainly reasonable to view devolution
and its related emphasis on community health as positives steps in
revitalizing Nova Scotia health care, these steps can also be characterized
as ultimately just different types of cost cutting measures cast in the
rhetoric of reform. The government no longer characterizes changes in
health care as reform but now speaks of these measures in terms of
renewal. 30 However, cynicism is easily overplayed and dismissal of the
ongoing changes as a political ploy overlooks a significant series of
efforts that have the potential to dramatically alter the future course of
Nova Scotia Medicare.
2. Illinois
a. Overview of Medicaid
Like the rest of America, Illinois is characterized by a diverse health
system composed of a patchwork of public and private programs. While
Illinois has been slower in the development of managed care than other
parts of the United States, there are currently close to twenty plans in the
Chicago area and many hospitals in the state have become part of
integrated delivery networks.131 Illinois' Medicaid program has an enroll-
ment of 1.4 million people of which 400,000 are elderly nursing home
residents .132 The majority of Medicaid recipients are low-income indi-
viduals, primarily women and children. As is the case with Nova Scotia
Medicare, Illinois Medicaid has experienced dramatic growth in the
1990s and is now the state's largest social service program. When
Medicaid is combined with the state's health insurance benefit program
129. "Blueprint Committee," supra note 123 at 9.
130. S. MacKinlay, "Selling Health Reform" The [Halifax] Daily News (16 July 1996).
131. Illinois Association of HMOs, Annual Statistics 1997.
132. Illinois Department of Public Aid, Research and Analysis: All Programs Caseload
Report File 03.ALLP 797 (July 1997).
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for employees and dependents, the Illinois government can be seen to be
the jurisdiction's largest purchaser of health care.' 33 In the period 1992-
94, the state Medicaid program doubled in size, and by 1996 its annual
expenditure reached $6.5 billion. 134 The program's growth has become a
threat to the state's abilities to finance other programs and continued
unabated growth will result in either major budgetary cuts or a state tax
increase.
The financial woes of Illinois Medicaid are not unique to the state, but
are shared by every other U.S. Medicaid program. Money problems can
be traced to three principal factors: health care cost inflation, demo-
graphic and economic changes pushing enrollment, and increased, largely
unfunded, federal mandates to expand covered services. Until recently,
states had little room to be creative in managing Medicaid programs as
they were caught between the expanding federal requirements and court
directives that grew out of legal challenges to state attempts to impose
cost cutting measures. Medicaid has been largely invisible to the general
public because it is a highly complex program serving a poor constitu-
ency, and it only becomes politically significant when its costs impact on
the state's abilities to provide services in other areas.'35
Illinois Medicaid offers a comprehensive range of inpatient and
outpatient services to program recipients, well beyond the core benefit
package mandated by the federal government. 36 Medicaid reimburses
hospitals on a predetermined payment scale which is related to the
patient's discharge diagnosis; it uses a prospective payment reimburse-
ment model taken from the federal Medicare program. On the outpatient
and physician service side, payments are on a fee-for-service basis
according to rates contained in a number of reimbursement schedules.'37
The past two decades of Illinois Medicaid have been characterized by
state efforts to control expenditures by using waiver provisions in the
federal law to adopt approaches to reimbursement and coverage not
allowed by the original Medicaid law. The Illinois hospital industry has
been plagued by a program with a very slow reimbursement turnaround
time and has taken legal action against the state on the grounds that
Medicaid failed to meet the federal standards of adequate payment, as
133. Jay Fitzgerald, "Medicaid Overhaul on the Table" (1994) 20 Illinois Issues 18-22.
134. Mark Reuter, "Rocketing Medicaid Costs Pose Major Problems for State Budget" U. of
Ideas Business & Economics Series, News Bureau of the University of Illinois (February
1995).
135. "Medicaid Overhaul," supra note 132.
136. 89 111. Admin. Code 142.400 (1996).
137. 305 ICLS 5/5-19 (1996).
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articulated in the Medicaid Boren Amendment.'38 Physician payment
rates are among the lowest in the United States. As a result the number of
participating doctors is low and those who do participate offset the low
rates by increasing their volume of Medicaid patients.'39 The program is
also very vulnerable to fraudulent billing problems, particularly in the
areas of pharmaceuticals and physician and diagnostic services. Structur-
ally, Medicaid is a maze of complex eligibility and reimbursement rules
which are subject to constant change, confusing bureaucrats, providers
and recipients alike. The recently enacted federal welfare reform legisla-
tion severs the link between Medicaid eligibility and welfare, but the
transition to new eligibility rules will only lead to further programmatic
confusion.' 4
b. Attempts at Reform
During the past two decades, Illinois has launched a number of initiatives
to restructure its Medicaid program by taking advantage of federal
waivers and loopholes in the Medicaid law. The goal is to develop more
cost effective approaches to this program. On the hospital side, two
initiatives are particularly noteworthy: one is a special service contract
bidding system and the other is an institutional provider tax. In 1984
Illinois enacted the Health Finance Reform Act which established the
Illinois Competitive Access and Reimbursement Equity Program
(ICARE) .14 The ICARE program was a contract bidding system in which
certain hospitals negotiated a global budget for inpatient Medicaid
services, based on an initial blind bidding process. The ICARE global
budget is akin to Nova Scotia Medicare, but the Illinois system did not
include every hospital, for only low bidders were allowed to participate.
The difficulties experienced under ICARE related to the inability to
predict accurately inpatient Medicaid utilization. Often participating
hospitals were forced to seek supplemental Medicaid funding because
they expended their annual allotments prior to the end of their respective
138. 42 U.S.C.S. 1396a(a)(13)(A) and 42 U.S.C.S. 1983, repealed P.L. 105-33 s.4711, to be
codified at 42 U.S.C.S. 1396a(13). With the repeal of the Boren amendment states will have
more flexibility in designing payment structures for Medicaid, but whatever is designed must
be structurally valid to withstand likely judicial challenges which virtually all state payment
schemes are subjected to.
139. Jane Perkins, "Increasing Provider Participation in the Medicaid Program: Is there a
doctor in the house?" (1989) 26 Social Security Reporting Service 846.
140. 42 U.S.C. § 615 (1997).
141. P.A.83-1243 (1984),codifiedlll.Rev. Stat. 1984,ch. 111 1/2 s.6503-1 etseq.,repealed
1992; Arsenio Oloroso Jr. "State Eyes Medicaid Fix; Plan to Tax Hospitals Seen" Crain's
Chicago Business (27 May 1991) 1.
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budget years. On the heels of a failed ICARE system, the state adopted
the Medicare prospective payment system for hospitals and developed a
program to further increase federal funding for hospital and nursing home
care by imposing a special tax on these institutional providers. 42 Provid-
ers were taxed on the basis of their revenue and those taxes were used to
increase the pool of monies the state had available for Medicaid, which
in turn increased the federal government's matching payments to the
state. In the initial stages of the provider tax arrangement, individual
facilities benefitted directly by having their tax payments plus increased
federal dollars returned to them directly in their Medicaid reimburse-
ments. Quickly the federal government tightened the loophole, making it
more difficult for states to manipulate the federal matching payments
through special provider tax schemes.
143
While ICARE and the provider tax were creative approaches to
institutional funding, financial difficulties continued to plague Illinois'
Medicaid and a fundamental awareness persisted amongst state regula-
tors that a more basic change to the program was needed. With the growth
of managed care in the private sector, both in Illinois and around the
country, it was only natural that this seemingly more cost effective way
of delivering health care became the primary model for Medicaid reform.
The seeds of Illinois Medicaid managed care were sown in the early
1980s with changes in federal law that allowed states to contract with
health maintenance organizations (HMO) and other risk-bearing entities
for treatment of Medicaid recipients. 14 In 1984 Illinois launched a
Medicaid managed care demonstration project in the inner city of
Chicago enrolling individuals in HMOs or hybrid managed care plans
known as Prepaid Health Plans (PHP). The PHPs were formed by inner
city hospitals that had large Medicaid patient populations in their service
areas and, while akin to HMOs, they did not have to meet state law
capitalization requirements. 145 In the early 1990s, the state launched a
special managed care project referred to as Healthy Moms/Healthy Kids
which was designed to deliver prenatal care and childhood immuniza-
tions to inner city populations.'46 While the state promoted managed care
enrollment for Medicaid recipients, it placed limits on the number of
Medicaid and Medicare enrollees in licensed managed care entities,
142. Ibid.
143. Lynn Wagner, "Hospitals to Carry On Fight Over Medicaid Restrictions" Modern
Healhcare (9 December 1991).
144. 47 FR 43087 (30 September 1982), 48 FR 54013 (Nov. 30, 1983), 42 CFR 431
SubpartL.
145. 89 111. Admin. Code 142.240 (1996).
146. Supra note 137.
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fearing that plans with large enrolments of publicly supported patients
might not be economically viable.'47 Recognizing the potential for
increased utilization from publicly supported patients, HMOs often
sponsored separate programs for Medicare and Medicaid patients, typi-
cally with fewer participating providers and service options than their
commercial counterparts.
By the mid-1990s, growing numbers of the state's 1.1 million Medic-
aid recipients were enrolled in managed care offerings. This voluntary
enrolment was resulting in overall programmatic savings, further encour-
aging the state to promote this mechanism of delivery, but the effort to
move the Medicaid population into managed care was not always a
smooth one. A research study of the Chicago Medicaid managed care
experience demonstrated that many recipients did not understand the
differences between managed care and fee-for-service plans. The educa-
tional supports needed to effect a positive transition, as well as meaning-
ful participation in prepaid plans, were not present.'48 The Healthy Moms/
Healthy Kids program was plagued by costly administrative difficulties
and serious computer problems which reduced the ability of the program
to serve large numbers of recipients. 4 9 With the growth of managed care
entities in Illinois, anecdotes abounded about unethical marketing prac-
tices in which false and misleading information was given to entice
individuals into signing up with various plans. In one reported case,
Chicago street gang members were being paid finders fees for every new
member they signed up for a particular HMO. 5°
c. Mediplan Plus
In spite of the problems, the financial pressures placed on the state
continued. The burden of Medicaid increased to over 35 percent of state
expenditures and no other solutions to this cost dilemma, other than
managed care, were emerging. In September of 1994, the state of Illinois
submitted an application for a federal waiver under Section 1115 of the
U.S. Social Security Act) 5. ' The 1115 waivers are designed to test unique
147. Ibid. 5/5-16.3.
148. Janet Reis & Lynn Olson, "The Medicaid Program and Consumer Needs: A Survey
Among Residents of a Poor Chicago Neighborhood" (1987) 102 Public Health Service Reports
530-538.
149. "Illinois: Medicaid Reform Plans Under Renewed Scrutiny" Health Line (30 January
1995).
150. Porter W. Myrick Jr., "Medicaid Reform in Illinois" (unpublished paper on file with the
author).
151. 42 U.S .C. s. 1315(a); Illinois Department of Public Aid, Illinois Mediplan Plus Protocol
(22 November 1996).
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and innovative approaches to health care funding and delivery and allow
a state to circumvent many of the standard requirements of the Medicaid
law.'52 The 1115 waiver has been the primary means state governments
have used to launch broad scale reform measures in their various
Medicaid programs. Most recently-obtained state waivers have resulted
in large-scale managed care programs.
Illinois' 1115 waiver called for a massive overhaul of the state's
Medicaid program, moving the bulk of recipients out of fee-for-service
medicine into managed care arrangements. 153 The state had anticipated
that the necessary approval from the U.S. Health Care Financing Admin-
istration would occur in three to four months and planned to implement
the program by the summer of 1995. But approval took considerably
longer due to political problems caused by a Republican state administra-
tion seeking a waiver from a Democratic-controlled federal agency.
Beyond politics, there were serious reservations about the state's abilities
to manage a program of such dimensions, in view of its poor experiences
with the Healthy Moms/Healthy Kids program, as well as the perception
that the timetable for moving so many recipients into existing, and yet to
be developed, managed care entities was unrealistic. It was not until July
1996 that the Health Care Financing Administration approved the Illinois
waiver application; this was almost two years after the original submis-
sion.'54
The Illinois waiver proposal, referred to as Mediplan Plus, is an
attempt to create a statewide integrated health program based on a
network of competitive managed care plans.'55 While Medicaid recipi-
ents will retain their ability to choose fee-for-service providers, that
aspect will likely be phased out over time. Replacing the current system
will be a health care environment composed of existing managed care
entities and newly created ones known as Managed Care Community
Networks (MCCN). 56 To cover rural areas of the state and to allow for
152. Physician Payment Review Commission, Annual Report to Congress (1997) 425.
153. Supra note 151.
154. Arsenio Oloroso Jr., "State Medicaid Savings Plan Delayed-Again," Crain's Chicago
Business (24 February 1997).
155. Supra note 151. Currently in Illinois there are two primary types of licensed managed
care models, a Health Maintenance Organization (HMO), and a Preferred Provider Organiza-
tion (PPO) (see prior discussion after n. 56). A third managed care product that is emerging in
Illinois is a Provider Sponsored Organization (PSO) which is typically a joint venture
arrangement between a medical group and a hospital which in turn contracts to treat patients
in a given medical plan and assumes partial or total risk for doing so. Currently the U.S.
Medicare program is developing plans to allow its enrollees to participate in PSOs and it is
likely that Medicaid programs will do likewise.
156. 89 111. Admin. Code 142 et seq. (1996).
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enrollee choice, individual physicians, rural health clinics, federally
qualified health centres, and pediatric ambulatory care centres may be
designated as Enrolled Managed Care Providers and may provide ser-
vices under Mediplan Plus."' In addition, for the first year of the program,
Prepaid Health Plans created in the 1980s and early 1990s may continue
to participate as risk-bearing entities but must convert their organizations
into MCCNs.
The state has developed multiple criteria for the participation of
managed care entities in Mediplan Plus, such as adherence to state
sanctioned formularies and demonstration of adequate numbers of en-
rolled physicians who are participating providers under contract in
Medicaid.'58 The specific services which a managed care entity (MCE)
must provide are detailed by state regulations, and it is these services
which are eligible for capitated reimbursement. Also, participating
MCEs must have the capacity to coordinate their services with commu-
nity based public health providers. Behavioural health, mental health and
rehabilitation services do not fall under Mediplan Plus but will continue
to be covered as separate ("carve-out") services on a fee-for-service
basis. This decision raises questions about whether established managed
care plans that capitate mental health and rehabilitation services will want
to participate since fee-for-service requirements in these areas will add to
their costs.
Medicaid managed care plans must provide each enrollee with a care
coordinating provider, that is a primary care physician who will direct and
monitor an individual's medical treatment and make the necessary
referrals for specialty services. Plans must have agreements with care
coordinating providers within thirty miles or thirty minutes of their
enrollee populations. The managed care entity cannot restrict a physician
from providing information about plan policies in matters such as
utilization review and quality assurance, nor information about what
competing plans may offer. Recipients are free to join any plan that meets
their particular needs, but once enrolled they may not switch to another
Medicaid plan for one year.159
While the number of MCEs in Illinois is growing, the state lacks
sufficient managed care plans to absorb over a million new Medicaid
enrollees. Hence, the Mediplan Plus proposal calls for the development
of a hybrid managed care entity,the Managed Care Community Network,
which will be designed specifically for this population. The MCCN is a
157. Ibid., 142.260.
158. Ibid., 142.230; 142.260.
159. Ibid., 142.390(d).
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type of risk bearing entity, but unlike a licensed HMO, its capitalization
requirements are much lower."6 While county governments may launch
MCCNs, the Mediplan Plus scheme envisions that these entities will be
created by hospitals that already sponsor Medicaid prepaid health plans
or have a significant number of Medicaid patients. State regulations for
MCCNs specify net worth requirements which must be met for initial and
subsequent years of operation that are dependent on the size of population
service areas. MCCNs which fall below required net worth amounts must
either meet the state standard or freeze enrollments. Additionally MCCNs
will need to establish a trust fund to pay for non-participating providers
and, more significantly, to act as a safeguard in the event of bankruptcy
or insolvency. A detailed set of regulations has been issued concerning
the role of the Department of Public Aid in the event that a participating
managed care plan goes bankrupt, including the transferral of manage-
ment to the state agency. In view of prior financial problems in managed
care and the uncertain financial viability of Medicaid-only managed care
entities, the attention to bankruptcy protection is not unwarranted.'
6'
Even with the creation of a new managed care entity (the MCCN) there
is still a need for a more expansive managed care network. Indeed, as
noted above, a special category of managed care providers was estab-
lished for physicians and clinics in rural and inner city areas known as
Enrolled Managed Care Providers (EMCP). An EMCP will most typi-
cally be a primary care physician who will both provide direct medical
care services and also take on the role of managing the overall care of an
enrollee across the spectrum of state sponsored health services. The
EMCP will act as a system gatekeeper whose authorization will be
required for most covered services. Unlike participating managed care
entities, EMCPs will be paid on a fee-for-service basis for direct patient
care, but they will be capitated for patient management services, with a
limitation on their patient lists of 1500 individuals.
62
A major concern of federal and state regulators alike is the potential
marketing abuses which can occur as plans scramble to attract enrollees
and increase capitation payment amounts, regardless of service capaci-
ties. The state of Illinois requires all participating providers in Mediplan
Plus to develop an annual marketing plan which must be approved by
state regulators. While the initial regulatory goal is to prevent misleading
and fraudulent information about a particular plan, there is also a desire
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required to have interpreters who can explain plan policies and benefits
to non-English speaking recipients. Financial inducements to enroll or
disenroll from a plan are prohibited, but in some instances to generate
interest in a particular managed care offering, inducements that relate to
health care (i.e., health education, screening) may be allowed. Individuals
who engage in marketing for participating managed care plans must
clearly identify the plan they represent, be registered with the state
Medicaid program, and be licensed in a fashion similar to insurance
brokers .163
The structural changes to be instituted by Mediplan Plus should add
order to a rather disjointed health care program and in the process
improve individual and public health, but the state's primary motivation
behind this scheme is cost control. The core of the cost control effort and
the accompanying desire to more efficiently manage Medicaid expendi-
tures rests on capitation. It is thus essential for capitated rates to be set low
enough for the state to realize savings, yet sufficient to make the provision
of comprehensive managed care to Medicaid recipients economically
viable for the plans. There is also a danger that participating plans will
maximize their capitation payments by pursuing policies of
undertreatment. To insure viability and safeguard against abuses, Illinois
regulators will need to develop capitation rates on an individual plan
basis. The reimbursement rates will need to be actuarially sound and
subject to periodic adjustment based upon individual MCE utilization
profiles. If a particular plan has a high rate of justified utilization for more
costly services, the state may need to raise its per-plan-per-member
monthly rate, but leverage here is limited because state regulations have
placed a ceiling on capitation amounts. Rates will also be affected by
geography, as the state will calculate capitation on the basis of wage and
population variations in five different regions)6 4
Each Mediplan Plus participating program will be required to have a
quality assurance plan in place that ensures that the entity meets commu-
nity quality standards as well as appropriate federal and state mandates.
The quality activities are to be overseen by physician plan members, and
a senior physician is to be assigned as the executive with primary
responsibility for this area. Quality in the Mediplan Plus context entails
developing and monitoring access standards, implementing an enrollee
orientation program, developing a complaint log, checking the providers'
credentials, implementing a state of the art medical record and manage-
163. Ibid., 142.255(f).
164. Ibid., 142.505
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ment information system and conducting peer reviews, quality of care
assessments and utilization studies.
65
A critical component of quality assurance for Mediplan Plus managed
care entities will be health education and prevention activities. The
managed care movement was founded on the basis of promoting good
health, but with commercialization that goal has often been overlooked.
It is particularly important for health programs serving the poor that
enrollees have access to health education. The state requires that partici-
pating plans develop multimedia educational materials on common
health matters such as nutrition, chemical dependency, weight control
and smoking cessation, and further, that they have education coordinators
responsible for these activities. In the area of prevention, managed care
plans must follow state guidelines for developing specific services and
must have the capacity to track whatever preventive services the state
decides to require. In the wide range of mandated quality activities,
education and prevention will present managed care plans with the
greatest challenges, but these areas, perhaps more than capitation, hold
the greatest promise for improving public health, and in turn, containing
Medicaid expenditures.66
Once the state waiver was approved, the Illinois Department of Public
Aid began the detailed process of implementing the Mediplan Plus
program. Regulations for the program were issued in October of 1996,
and a detailed protocol was submitted to the federal Health Care Financ-
ing Administration.167 Under the waiver process, federal approval of the
application is only the first stage of implementation; during both the
implementation and operational phases of Mediplan Plus there will be
ongoing federal oversight. In early 1997 the state issued a request to
organizations and individuals to submit bids to become enrolled managed
care providers. Those whose bids are accepted must then negotiate
individual participation contracts with the state .168 The federal regulators
have expressed detailed concerns about Illinois Mediplan Plus, focusing
on general inconsistencies in state policies and requesting additions and
changes in almost every operational area of the program. 169 The U.S.
165. Ibid., 142.700.
166. Ibid., 142.700(b)(5).
167. Supra note 151.
168. Illinois Mediplan Plus, Request for Proposals for The Mediplan Plus Referral Agent
(1997).
169. Joel S. Truman, Project Officer, Department of Health and Human Services, U.S. Health
Care Financing Administration, Letter to George Havanec concerning comments on the
Illinois Department of Public Aid Operational Protocol (10 March 1997) (copy on file with
author).
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Health Care Financing Administration was very concerned with the
state's timeline for implementation, and in view of all the changes
required by the federal government, it may be well into 1998 before the
Mediplan Plus program is operational in any manner.
Like any major reform initiative, Mediplan Plus will likely undergo
more changes once it becomes operational. Under the 1997 Balanced
Budget Amendments, the section 1115 waiver was altered to allow states
greater flexibility in designing and operating managed care programs. 70
Even if federal oversight is relaxed, there are major questions to be
answered about the economic viability of managed care plans devoted
entirely to indigent patients. The abilities of managed care entities to
create effective education and prevention programs for poor populations
is very unclear. There are also doubts whether this scheme will attract a
sufficient number of participating managed care plans to spark genuine
competition in the Medicaid market. While Mediplan Plus introduces a
large scale capitated scheme to Illinois Medicaid, forty percent of
reimbursement falls into fee-for-service carve-out categories, rendering
the managed care portion of the system far from comprehensive.' 7' The
potential for abuse is also great and the state regulator, the Illinois
Department of Public Aid, will be taxed in trying to oversee and manage
a program of this scope. There is a danger that if the state does not realize
major savings in the early stages of Mediplan Plus, or any scaled-down
managed care effort, Illinois will not retain a commitment to making this
or any comprehensive managed care scheme work for long, but will begin
to look for alternative approaches. The other reality that any state must
deal with in Medicaid is the inevitability that both providers and recipi-
ents will mount legal challenges which will have the potential to alter
specific program initiatives and even overall programmatic operations.
On balance, Mediplan Plus is a bold effort but ultimately its success will
170. With the passage of the Balanced Budget Amendment of 1997, the Director of the
Illinois Department of Public Aid, the agency responsible for managing the Mediplan Plus and
the federal waiver process, indicated that the state might decide to abandon the program; Judith
Graham & Rick Pearson, "Illinois May Drop Plan for Big Medicaid Shift" Chicago Tribune
(1 October 1997). The announcement triggered predictable political responses from the state
Democratic leadership who indicated that they would hold the Republican state administration
to its legislated obligations. It seems likely that Illinois will take advantage of the liberalized
1115 Medicaid waiver policies in the Balanced Budget Amendment, and will make changes
in Mediplan Plus, but politically it does not seem feasible for the program to be dropped. What
is likely to be altered is the notion of a statewide program; it will probably be replaced by
managed care programs primarily in inner city areas. See P.L. 105-33, s. 4757, to be codified
at42 U.S.C. s.1315.
171. "Illinois HMOS Say Profits May Suffer Under Mediplan Plus Carve-Out Proposal"
(1997) 3 BNA Managed Care Reporter 448-449.
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rest on whether it can better serve the health needs of a large and
vulnerable population and at the same time attract the support of a
skeptical provider community.
Conclusion
There are few nations in the world that have more commonalities than
Canada and the United States, but in the area of government-sponsored
health care it is hard to imagine that the two countries share the same
continent. The differences between the Canadian and American health
systems are striking and fundamental, ranging from divergent views
about the nature of health itself, to the roles of government in this
enterprise, and the nature of effective health care delivery programs. 72 In
Canada, economic concerns have spurred a broad reexamination of how
provincial health plans can continue to meet their mandates in light of
fiscal realities. While change is the order of the day across the spectrum
of Canadian health care, there is a continuing commitment, evidenced by
the reports of the National Forum on Health and the provincial health
ministers, to adaptation within the current structure and to retention of the
fundamental principles of a government-sponsored, comprehensive health
care system. The United States, by contrast, has moved away from the
notion of a universal health program and is relying on the managed care
market to bring about access, order and efficiency. Federal budgetary
pressures, sparked in part by uncontrolled growth in American Medicare
and Medicaid, have led U.S. policy makers to endorse managed care as
the best strategy to control and rationalize these programs. While the
American public is concerned about health care insurance coverage, the
all-important middle class has not expressed a desire for broad-based
reform, and public interest in Medicare and Medicaid remains specific to
individual needs. There is now a strong backlash against managed care in
the United States that is fuelled by a growing consumer movement. But
that reaction is not a response to health policy, rather it is the expression
of concerns over the disruption that the new managed care schemes cause
to traditional relationships within the medical system.'73
While it is easy to dwell on differences between Canada and the United
States, a careful examination of health care systems in the two countries
172. Nova Scotia, House of Legislative Assembly, Debates (4 January 1996) at 571-574.
173. Thomas Bodenheimer, "HMO Backlash- Righteous or Reactionary" (1996) 335 New
Eng. J. Med. 1601-4.
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reveals commonalities in the broad issues that both face. The overriding
reality for Canadian and American health care is the need to confront
fiscal problems; both governments must find effective ways to contain
costs if their respective public health care programs are to survive.
Government-sponsored health care has forced the two nations to meet
broad and increasingly costly mandates, yet reform efforts of any sort are
difficult because they must be developed in highly politicized environ-
ments. While the Canadian system is comprehensive, economic pres-
sures have led to considerations of delisting services and questions loom
about the future scope of coverage. Similarly in the United States, high
cost procedures covered under the Medicare and Medicaid programs are
coming under increasing scrutiny and there has been a strong move to
mandate lower priced outpatient treatment. In the case of one U.S.
jurisdiction, Oregon, cost concerns led state regulators to adopt a highly
controversial program of rationing for its Medicaid program.'74
In both Canada and the United States the economic disparities across
jurisdictions have made the goal of national uniformity in government-
sponsored health programs challenging to attain. Both countries have
experienced strains in intergovernmental relationships between federal
and provincial/state governments over health care. In Canada provincial
governments clearly have far more control over their respective health
plans than has been the case in the American Medicaid program, but in
both countries the roles of the different levels of government are not
settled and mistrust and politics cloud these relationships. Ottawa clings
to the notion that it can enforce the dictates of the Canada Health Act, but
with the reduction of cash transfers and the tensions in the Canadian
federation itself, that may not be easily accomplished . 75 Washington has
a federal health bureaucracy in place that has little respect for the abilities
of state governments to reform effectively their Medicaid programs
without extensive federal oversight, and the newly granted leverage
given states under the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 may be very short-
lived. The notion of converting the federal side of the Medicaid program
into a block grant was raised in 1996, as part of the American version of
health care devolution, but proved unworkable as a result of Congres-
sional bickering about how particular states' grant funding formulas
should be calculated.
In both countries there is uncertainty about the future roles of physi-
cians. In Canada, there is an increased focus on community health
174. Thomas Bodenheimer, "The Oregon Health Plan Lessons for the Nation" (1997) 337
New Eng. J. Med. 651.
175. Campbell, supra note 18.
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services, and a concerted effort to move health care outside of physician-
dominated tertiary-care centres. Provincial health reform strategies are
clearly motivated by a desire to reduce the power of organized medicine
over health policy. In the United States, there is a growing reliance on
primary care physicians who act as the gatekeepers in managed care
plans, but there are shortages of primary care physicians and plans to
convert current specialists into general medical practitioners are not well
developed. While there is no concerted American effort to break the
stronghold of medicine over health policy, the growth of managed care,
fuelled by large purchasers, has clearly eroded the power of medical
lobbies. They are now engaged in a desperate attempt to recover their
authority. In both countries there are increasing consumer demands for
the latest innovative medical treatment and a resultant growth of entrepre-
neurial physicians who for the right fee will satisfy public demands.
For the United States there are lessons in the Canadian experience.
First and foremost, there is a need to develop a viable, long-term set of
goals concerning the future directions of American health care. While the
Canadian system is in a phase of adaptation and reform, even amid change
there is a fundamental commitment to a role for government in health and
an ongoing attempt to define what the nature of Canadian health care
should be. Although the United States runs two giant, publicly controlled
health systems, it has never come to terms with what the long range goals
of either the Medicare or Medicaid systems should be. Rhetoric about
quality, access and efficiency is scattered across the American health
policy landscape, but core concepts of health and public health are elusive
and tend to be dominated by economic considerations. It may be naiveto
think that the mere articulation of goals will transform a health system but
clearly some sense of direction is needed to avoid the constant and rapid
process of reinvention that characterizes U.S. health care. What would be
particularly helpful in the American situation would be the development
of mechanisms to better link the medical treatment model with the public
health needs of the population.
Although the structures being spawned by the U.S. move to managed
care may have many potential benefits in terms of economics, access and
continuity of health care, the success of this new paradigm depends upon
the viability of choice and the strength of competitive health care markets.
While the marketplace has been the focal point of American innovation
and productivity, it is an untested forum for health care and clearly its
orientation to efficiency is not motivated by a sense of equity and access.
Even if competitive health markets do produce economic efficiencies and
spark competition on the basis of quality for private sector plans, it is not
clear that similar results can be produced for Medicaid managed care.
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Unquestionably, local markets driven by managed care have already
experienced dramatic alterations in local health systems, but the long-
term implications of these alterations for the population are not at all
clear. In particular, there are uncertainties about whether the realign-
ments of health markets have had any positive benefits for disenfran-
chised populations. At some point U.S. regulators may need to take a
more direct approach to health care markets and use their regulatory
power to mandate a more rationalized system, as is being done in Canada,
to ensure access to medical care, particularly for low-income individuals
and families.
For Canada, as its provinces struggle with reconfiguring their health
systems, the American experiences in managed care should be helpful. In
particular, the use of risk-adjusted capitation linked to defined health care
outcomes could result in more judicious use of physician services, and as
such it could become a tool to better manage medical services insurance
programs. Capitation, however, is a work in progress and there are now
capitated programs in the United States which are focusing on specialists
as opposed to primary care doctors. 7 6 Indeed, there are numerous
capitation structures being experimented with in the United States. Those
being developed in the American Medicare and Medicaid programs are
particularly relevant to Canadian Medicare, if for no other reason than to
illustrate the range of possibilities in the area.
While a regulatory approach used by Canadian health plans maybe an
effective way to rationalize the health system and bring about cost
savings, provincial departments of health should consider giving indi-
vidual and institutional providers leeway to devise creative treatment
models that are not government initiated. In particular, governments may
want to allow experiments with direct contract arrangements between
government, private insurers and physicians and hospital groups, testing
various approaches to risk transference and capitation. Underpinning the
American experience in publicly sponsored managed care is a willing-
ness on the part of government to transfer programmatic operations to the
private sector, most recently to for-profit managed care programs. While
for-profit health care is a difficult proposition in the Canadian context,
use of private sector managed care vehicles should not be rejected by
provincial governments on philosophical grounds. Their potential to
control costs should be carefully considered. As more services fall
outside the ambit of provincial plans, policy makers may want to consider
allowing various managed care options for these uncovered services, and
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if those options are successful, they could be incorporated into provincial
Medicare programs and possibly expanded to cover core services.
Moving to the regional government level, there are also several mutual
lessons that can be learned from consideration of the Nova Scotia and
Illinois experiences. There is an old adage that programs for the poor are
poor programs, and while Illinois is locked into a federal/ state Medicaid
structure, it should consider that adage in its Medicaid planning. The
Mediplan Plus program is an innovative experiment, but if its reimburse-
ment rates are too low, it will not attract the necessary participation of
private sector managed care. Without private sector involvement, Mediplan
Plus will become a network of hybrid managed care plans that will
function outside the context of broader health care markets. In such a
scenario, competition and resultant savings among Medicaid managed
care plans is unlikely. Illinois needs to take a broader look at its entire
health system and devise a service delivery strategy which is more
comprehensive than the creation of a program for one segment of the
population. While it is unlikely that the state could devise a strategy as
sweeping as Nova Scotia's health reform, if Medicaid is ever to develop
a more stable future it will need to be better integrated into the state's
general health system. Illinois regulators cannot rely exclusively on
untested markets, but will need to intervene more directly to ensure equal
access to all of the state's medical programs for its low-income residents.
The state should craft a detailed strategy for public health services,
particularly for the Medicaid population whose health problems fre-
quently stem from social, environmental and educational needs. Finally
Illinois needs to have a mechanism to allow for citizen input into the
creation of new health programs. Devolution in Illinois along Nova
Scotia lines may not work, but large public efforts like Mediplan Plus
need to have a better connection to recipients, and not be totally domi-
nated by politicians and bureaucrats whose interests are exclusively
driven by cost and political considerations. For a program as detailed and
complex as Mediplan Plus, the lack of public input and discourse
surrounding its development and implementation is troubling.
In the case of Nova Scotia, considerable progress has been made
toward restructuring its health system through downsizing and devolu-
tion. If progress is to continue, provincial policy makers will need to
allow Regional Health Boards freedom to initiate new and innovative
delivery models. In that regard the Nova Scotia Department of Health and
Regional Health Boards ought to consider various aspects of U.S.
managed care, and attempts to create comprehensive regional health
plans should be encouraged. Managed care, viewed as a comprehensive
system of health delivery that unites ambulatory and inpatient services
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with health education and prevention, is compatible with the goals of
Nova Scotia Medicare. In particular, structural details of a public pro-
gram such as Illinois Mediplan Plus could provide helpful insights to
Nova Scotia health policy makers, especially the Managed Care Commu-
nity Network model. More specifically, Nova Scotia could benefit from
considering how Illinois and other American public health insurance
programs are dealing with the capitation issue, since the nuances of policy
in this area are yet to be formulated by the province and creating
appropriate incentives in capitation is a difficult process.
Canada and the United States, and their respective subparts, are studies
in contrast and similarities. There are undoubtedly a host of factors that
strain efforts at comparison. Still the problems facing health care systems
in North America, such as cost containment, access and quality, are
universal issues for national and regional governments. Neither Canada
nor the United States has a monopoly on creativity or commitment to their
respective health systems. It is necessary to look for guidance in different
approaches to health care problems and to show a willingness to adapt
innovations, recognizing that sound strategies in the face of complex
dilemmas deserve to move across borders.
